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PART I - INTRODUCTION
The need for a new look at the notion of legal science 
Legal theory is inevitably affected, for good or ill, by prevailing 
philosophies. This is especially the case when philosophical notions derive from 
changes in scientific method, for lawyers have always been fascinated by the 
notion that the study of law should and could be a scientific enterprise. The 
deductive models of science, fired by remarkable advances in mathematics, were 
introduced into the law by the jurisconsults of ancient Rome and in due course 
transmitted to both European Civil Law and the Common Law of England. The 
success of the physical sciences in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
especially those based on observation and experiment, provided an impetus for 
empiricist philosophies which were likewise put to work in legal theory, with the 
help of John Austin, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Progress 
in the social sciences in the early twentieth century again impacted on 
Jurisprudence in the Legal Realist movement.  These are the major themes: but 
legal change on a smaller scale occurs with every advance in scientific method 
which finds its way into a persuasive philosophy.
Traces of these movements can still be found in legal theory and even in 
legal practice but they are more like persisting remnants than live forces. We 
seem to be drifting along, jurisprudentially speaking, without much in the way of 
either direction or impetus, like a ship becalmed and lost in uncharted waters. 
The crew, as is to be expected in such situations, bicker and squabble about 
what directions we should take with some proclaiming that there is nothing to be 
done since the situation is hopeless.
 Yet help is ready at hand and skepticism is unwarranted. What are 
arguably the two most significant events in the last half century, so far as 
philosophy and scientific method are concerned, hold great promise for legal 
theory. These are: 
(1) The advent of language/logic philosophies especially those deriving from 
the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein
(2)  The computer revolution and the development of computer logics. 
These things are not new. They have been around for decades and are 
familiar, and indeed old hat, in the worlds of philosophy, science and business.  
Yet they have made little or no impact in law. One can find an occasional 
branching diagram in a textbook or law review article but they do not have the 
place or importance that is ascribed to them elsewhere. There are probably 
2several reasons for this unfortunate fact, but a major one must be that there is no 
real appreciation among lawyers of the philosophical ideas that underlie these 
great events or their implications for the theory and practice of law.1  This in turn 
relates to the continuing isolation of developing professions and institutions. We 
become progressively unaware of what  others are doing, so that unresolved 
problems lie  here and possible solutions there but they never meet.
It is the purpose of this article to see how currently available logical tools 
might be put to good use in legal theory and practice. In order to do this it is 
proposed :
(1) To review the development of the new notions about logical form
(2) To outline the development of linguistic logics and 
(3) To consider the applications of these things to the theory and practice 
of law and finally
(4) To outline a feasible and useful version of legal science.
PART II   CLASSICAL LOGIC AND MODERN FORMALISM
Logic in the old style – deductive and inductive approaches
The term logic, in its formal sense, is still commonly taken to refer to the 
logic of the syllogism; and modern introductory  books on logic continue to be built 
round the notions of Aristotle with perhaps a little introduction to symbolic logic and 
a section on so-called inductive logic.2  It is generally admitted by both teachers and 
students of these courses that they do not improve the reasoning ability of the 
student and, indeed, it is difficult to imagine what other practical uses they might 
have.
Two types of books purporting to instruct lawyers in logic continue to be 
published. One variety peddles basic syllogistic logic with some suggestion as to 
how it may apply to legal reasoning. The other adopts a sort of inductive method 
1 It is not being suggested here that the legal profession has not made use of contemporarily 
available computer resources.  It is the logical principle underlying the computer that has not 
been understood or incorporated into legal theory. Vast databases with sophisticated search 
engines and processing devices have already been created for legal purposes (including 
prediction), and the end is not yet.  But even sophisticated processing is fundamentally different 
from thinking in the philosophical sense; the latter is beyond the capabilities of even the most 
sophisticated of computer programs. The computer is irredeemably left brained: true reflective 
thinking requires imagination and creativity
2
 The term inductive logic was coined by John Stuart Mill to cover the formal methods of 
producing general propositions from factual information. It has been rendered largely irrelevant by 
the development of modern formal logics where systems are applied to facts rather than 
extracted from them.
3and studies the reasoning processes of real judges found in judicial opinions. It is 
submitted that both of these approaches miss the mark. The syllogism is seldom if 
ever used in real life arguments, including legal reasoning. The notion that courts 
begin with general principles and derive progressively particular propositions from 
them by deduction until they reach the case before them, never really worked in 
practice and can currently be considered dead. Some authors have suggested that 
bringing the facts of a case under a rule of law is a syllogistic argument since 
particulars are thereby subsumed under a general rule. But this is not so. The 
syllogism is based on a necessary connection between the premises and the 
conclusion: if you accept the former, the latter follows. This is not what happens 
when a legal term is applied to a case.
The second approach, extracting legal reasoning from judicial opinions3 is 
likewise misplaced effort. The problem here is that judges do not create logical 
forms, but take and apply anything that is available to them. They are users, not 
programmers. Their reasoning tools are commonly those forms already present in 
the law which they have inherited, or (rarely) that they have imported from other 
source. 
These approaches, both deductive and inductive, are inadequate in the 
sense that they appear to be out of step with what is happening in formal studies 
both in philosophy and in the practical world.  This is particularly unfortunate as 
there is a great deal of formal material available which is just begging to be put to 
use in the law. A brief account of the modern development of formalism should 
make this clear.
The development of modern formal studies – game theory
The various kinds of mathematics were treated by Plato and Aristotle as 
separate and distinct entities, though not necessarily unrelated, and these were in 
turn thought to be different from formal logic.4 The multiple category view of 
mathematics and logic persisted through the middle ages and has survived here 
and there into modern times. But Descartes in the seventeenth century had shown 
that that geometrical shapes could be described by algebraic formulae.5 And it was 
demonstrated in the early nineteenth century that the same held true for formal 
3 Julius Stone appears to me to take this approach. See his PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW, NY 
1973
4 The big question was how, and in what sense, the valid conclusions of these subjects were ”true”. 
Medieval philosophers were divided into two main parties, the realists maintaining that the 
symbols of mathematics represented real entities somewhere (the heavenly forms) and the 
nominalists who said that they existed only as general terms (names) with nothing real actually 
corresponding to them
5
 In his development of coordinate geometry. Any point in a line has X and Y coordinates so that 
shapes, made up of such points connected together, can be described by algebraic equations. 
The equation for a straight line at 450 to the base would be x = y. Descartes derived formulae for 
common shapes such as a triangle, a circle and a rectangle. He concluded that irregular shapes, 
whether two dimensional or three dimensional, could be represented by combinations of simpler 
more regular ones.
4logic.6  Finally, nineteenth century mathematicians, especially Gottlob Frege7, 
linked all forms of mathematics together in what has come to be described as game 
theory.
All formal systems can be viewed as games, like chess, with pieces (pawns, 
kings, queens, knights, bishops and castles) together with the proper moves and 
their consequences which represent the rules of the game. Arithmetic, algebra, 
geometry and logic are thus seen as games, with numbers, letters and shapes 
considered to be playing pieces while the various valid transformations that can be 
effected are the moves of the game.8 These games can be pure or applied. Pure 
games are just that, pastimes; but they can be applied to organize any set of 
materials, either for scientific or practical purposes.
The development of modern formal studies – Ludwig Wittgenstein
It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s9
contributions to formalism. He perceived that the game theory of mathematics 
applied equally well to a number of other things including ordinary language. 
Obviously the rules of grammar apply to language, but this was not important for 
Wittgenstein; who called this surface logic. He was more interested in other word 
games, embedded in ordinary language, that are used for all kinds of purposes, 
including argument. Wittgenstein’s first essays into this area focused on forms of 
language that imply the existence of something. His studies here led to the doctrine 
of verifiability according to which the meaning of any term consists of the steps and 
procedures that one might take to show whether the item indicated by the term 
existed or not. The initial product of this early work was a set of radical notions 
about the meaning of words, which came to be known as logical positivism.10
According to this theory, propositions that could not pass the verifiability test were 
to be regarded as not merely doubtful or false, but meaningless; they were just 
sounds signifying nothing.11 After initial enthusiasm, there was a general withdrawal 
from the stern logical positivist doctrines, with A.J. Ayer himself, its first publicist, 
6
 George Boole, Professor in the University of Cork, Ireland in the first part of the nineteenth 
century, represented formal logic in both arithmetical and algebraic forms.
7
 Professor at the University of Jena (born 1828-died 1905) who was primarily interested in the 
relationship between logic and mathematics.
8
 My colleague Richard Bowser has a most effective and illuminating introduction to formalism 
using the rules, present and potential, of baseball. 
9
 Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) an Austrian engineer who transferred to Manchester 
University’s famous school of engineering where he became interested in the theory of 
mathematics which led him to Cambridge where he began to study philosophy.
10
 Popularized in A.J. Ayer’s book LANGUAGE TRUTH AND LOGIC. Victor Gollantz, London 1936
11
 The main logical positivist tenets were that any term which could not be tested by a verification 
procedure was not merely false but meaningless. Moral statements were fitted into this form by 
considering them as emotive statements or statements about personal preferences. The great 
problems of traditional philosophy were considered to derive from misunderstandings of language 
and were therefore styled “pseudo-problems”. 
5leading the retreat.12 This, of course, was not the end of linguistic logic.13 The 
investigation of philosophical problems from the perspective of the logic of 
language is still very much alive. 
The early logical positivism has been largely replaced a number of different 
versions of linguistic logic.14 The most significant of these, especially from the 
perspective of legal theory, can be found in Wittgenstein’s own later modifications 
of his original ideas.15  In his later lectures and conversations with friends, he still 
maintained that the logical use of words should be viewed as the application of 
language games, but had come to regard function and context as vital notions in 
understanding their meaning.16  A different purpose creates a different meaning for 
the same word or sentence. One of Wittgenstein’s most quoted statements is that a 
lever is a rod used for a different purpose.17  He notes that even a different 
inflection on a word may change the meaning and show that it is intended as a 
command or to voice a question  to deny something or even to make a joke. This 
necessary connection between meaning and function is very important for legal 
theory. It makes it clear that statements, including statutory clauses, are not 
meaningful until we know their context and the ends that they are intended to 
promote. There can be no rules without background and purposes to give them 
meaning.18
Putting together what Wittgenstein is saying about logical forms; there are 
obviously three tasks to be performed when applying any logical game.
The system must be properly set up; the individual “pieces” must be 
clearly defined along with a consistent set of rules for the transformations 
(moves) that will be permitted.
12
 See The Philosophy of AJ Ayer Vol XX! In The Library of Living Philosophers. 1992.  Southern 
Illinois University. Ayer later conceded that many philosophical problems were real problems not 
merely due to confusions about the logical use of language. 
13
 The notion that many philosophical questions are pseudo-problems created by misuse of 
language is still a major investigational tool of language/logic philosophers.
14
 Perhaps the best known of these was “ordinary language philosophy” which considered the 
notions buried in common speech as the materials which philosophy could use to answer 
questions and especially to resolve conceptual puzzles. The underlying principle is that ordinary 
language contains a sort of wisdom derived from common experience. A. J. Ayer was extremely 
critical of this movement and with some reason. It could have been used at one time to show that 
the earth was flat.
15
 His later thinking is largely reconstructed from lecture notes made by his pupils (published as 
the green and brown books) and from conversations with friends, some of whom made shorthand 
notes of the discussion. See THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS. Harper 1986; PHILOSOPHICAL 
INVESTIGATIONS,3rd edn. ed Anscombe GEM. 1999. The investigations are also available, free, on 
the internet. 
16
 He felt that his earlier work in the Tractatus had focused too much on the indicative mood 
(factual statements) and on the logical use of nouns.
17
 See Philosophical Investigations Aphorism 10, where he discusses the rod being incorporated 
in the brake system of a railway engine and thus becoming a lever. 
18
 Commonly expressed as the maxim “no rules without reasons”.
6The things or the enterprise to which the system is being applied must be 
clearly identified. A change in application will usually require changes in the 
game.
The purposes or goals of the enterprise (application) must be identified 
and thereafter kept in mind when the calculus is being applied.
These three interrelated matters can be formally illustrated in the following 
diagram.
 If the three essential components are not present, the application will not 
work well, if at all. And each of these elements must be set up properly and used 
correctly. So if there is inconsistency within the system, ambiguity as to the 
applications, or if the goals sought are indeterminate, confusion will result.
Pure and applied formal systems
Formal systems, as was mentioned earlier, may be either pure, i.e. they 
are just games with no other purpose, or they can be applied. Mathematical and 
other logical games19 are commonly applied to real affairs for various purposes. 
Indeed, a formal system of one sort or another can usually be found or devised to 
represent and organize any materials that are not assembled in a totally random 
manner. Thus geometry was applied in ancient Egypt to resurvey the Nile delta 
every year when the floods had wiped out all the old landmarks: Copernicus and 
Galileo applied a somewhat more complex geometrical system to explain the 
movements of the heavenly bodies and cannon balls in flight: and an obscure 
physician devised statistics to standardize the preparations of foxglove tea that 
he used to treat patients with dropsy. An infinite variety of mathematical games 
can be devised. The older arithmetics used sets of ten units, presumably 
because we have ten fingers, but there is no reason in the world why we 
shouldn't use any number we please.20 Binary arithmetic uses only two units, 1 
19 These are commonly called calculus systems, especially by German authors. The term calculus 
unfortunately tends to be confused by students with the differential calculus of Newton and 
Leibniz.
20
 The mathematical quantity   is used as the unit in some mathematical systems designed for 
use in biological studies.
THE FORMAL CALCULUS (GAME)
THE APPLICATION
THE PURPOSES
7and 0, which allow it to be used as the basis of computer logic, since the ultimate 
component of a computer is a switch that has to be either "on" or "off". Currently, 
research mathematicians do the most amazing things with already established 
mathematical systems.21 They also tend to work with picture symbols (icons) 
rather than numbers or letters since they claim that mathematical processes 
have become too complicated to be represented as simple quantities or 
equations. It is hardly surprising then that many of the computer games that 
children play with are spin-offs from pure mathematical research. Much of our 
thinking is likewise carried out using visual symbols, icons or picture logics.22 The 
ball and stick images used to represent the chemical components of molecules in 
chemical theory are a familiar form of iconic logic. There can even be a logical 
use of stories.23
PART III.  APPLICATIONS OF MODERN FORMALISM TO LAW
The application of formalism to Jurisprudence – forms currently in use
Wittgenstein’s descriptions of language games apply very easily and 
naturally to law. In fact lawyers have been using language games for millennia. The 
Roman Law formulary and the Common Law writ deriving from it,24 not only carried 
a general notion as to what kind of action at law was being initiated but also the 
elements which had to be shown in order to succeed. This feature, associating 
elements with forms of action, has persisted even though the writs and forms of 
action associated with them have been officially abolished.25 The elements game, 
the relict of this procedural system, can be illustrated in virtually every part of the 
law, with the elements identified as key items in a set of legal terms. The result is 
21
 High echelon mathematicians are hired by the Department of Defense and by medical 
insurance interests to find better ways of evaluating defense spending and payments for medical 
services. The ways in which these experts tweak conventional statistical methods to get better 
results is, to say the least, remarkable. 
22
 Wittgenstein’s oft quoted statement that ‘the limits of my language are the limits of my mind” 
appears to have overlooked the possibility of thinking with visual symbols.
23
 James Montgomery Boyce, a decidedly conservative theologian, uses this rather novel notion 
to interpret the stories in the early chapters of the Book of Genesis, such as the tower of Babel 
and the serpent in the Garden of Eden. Story logics may also be considered an appropriate form 
for historical research.
24
 Sir William Maitland’s view that the Common Law owed little to Roman Law is well known and, 
generally speaking, justified. The two parted company and were each making their own way. But 
Roman Law influence was strong in the early period up to the time of Bracton; and many 
continental doctrines and institutions entered the Common Law at that time. The Royal justiciars 
who established the foundations of the Common Law were higher clerics with considerable 
knowledge of Canon Law and/or Roman Law. Maitland recognized this commenting on the 
formulary system that it is distinctively English  but also in a certain sense, very Roman. See 
Pollock & Maitland, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, vol ii. p 558.
25
 Maitland’s comment is apt here that “The forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us 
from their graves.” THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW (1909) p.1 
8sometimes called the “AND” game 26 since all of the items mentioned in the 
definition must be shown to be present before the action can succeed. The four 
elements of the action on the case in negligence are well known illustrations of 
game theory, but it could be matched in almost every part of the law. Another 
traditional game is where a showing of all the possible elements is not required but 
at least one must be proved. This is similar to the use of the term “or” in the 
disjunctive syllogism and indeed this kind of form is sometimes called the “OR” 
game. The law of damages is an obvious example where at least one form of 
damage must be shown in order to succeed.27
Setting this out formally, the "AND" and “OR” games are arranged in the 
form:
A + B + C = X (the activating term in the “AND” game) &
A or B or C = X (the activating term in the “OR” game)
Virtually any functioning part of the law can be analyzed in this manner. 
The basic elements of offer and acceptance together constitute a bargain and 
this, together with consideration (or something else deemed to show legal intent), 
constitutes a legally enforceable contract. Procedural law and remedies can be 
represented in the same way.
Another simple language/logic maneuver is involved in explaining the 
meaning of legal terms by showing how they apply to paradigmatic cases. Thus a 
typical positive illustration may be given, where the term clearly applies, followed by 
a clearly negative example and then perhaps some borderline cases will be 
mentioned. This was a standard technique in medieval law books, for example 
Bacon’s REGULA, and is still used in modern horn books. It is reminiscent of what 
Wittgenstein calls the “ostensive learning” of language; where the term is
mentioned while a finger is being pointed at a thing. For example several blue 
objects may be pointed out to the pupil as the word is spoken, to teach the meaning 
of the term “blue”.28 This too can be formally represented by what have been 
described by  students as “the circles of Aristotle”, representing the notions of “All”, 
“None” and “Some”. 
26
 Roy Stone (The Compleat Wrangler, 50 Minnesota Law Review 1001 (1966) cites Russell and 
Whitehead as saying that all mathematics boils down to two key terms "and" representing 
conjunction and "or" representing dissociation.
27
 This is of course the “weak”  form of disjunction: at least one of the alternatives must be true 
but there can be more than one. In the “strong” form of disjunction, only one of the alternatives 
may be true.
28
 Philosophical Investigations. Op.Cit,  Aphorism 6
A B A B A B
All B is A No B is A Some B is A
9In the legal context, this kind of form can be used to indicate that a given fact 
pattern is clearly within the meaning of a legal term, clearly outside it, or that it is a 
borderline case which must be decided by some other means. Commonly such 
doubtful cases are decided either by resemblance to precedent cases or by 
reference to the tendency of the decision to further the acknowledged policies of 
that piece of legal apparatus.
Other available formal devices –the algorithm
There are a number of simple formal tools that are currently much used in 
other professions, but have somehow failed to attract much attention on the part 
of legal scholars. Perhaps the most common of these is the branching logic 
device of the algorithm. The is the basic arrangement of computer logic based on 
binary arithmetic with the numbers 0 and 1 representing that a “switch” is either 
off or on.29 The algorithm is used a great deal in medical writing where it can 
represent all sorts of things such as the steps in a diagnostic process, starting 
perhaps with a rash and ending with the most likely disorders which might be 
causing it. 
The algorithm has much to commend it for use in legal writing.30
First, it is an excellent discipline to be able to organize materials in this 
formal way. One is more apt to see confusions and omissions in the 
diagram than when they are buried in the written text.
An existing diagram can act as a check list of items that should be 
considered when reviewing an area of organized knowledge with a view to 
applying it for some purpose or other.31
It is an efficient way to communicate the results of any study to other 
researchers or professionals. Readers can pick up a total overview of the 
findings more quickly and more accurately than would be the case with a 
narrative report. They can also more easily see whether and where they 
may disagree with the writer. They may even indicate the nature of their 
29
 Binary mathematics would appear to allow only two alternatives at each step, but this is not the 
case. Combinations of 0 and 1 can be used so that any number of possibilities can be 
represented at each dividing point in the process.
30
 The algorithm may even have been implicitly present in the medieval model of legal learning 
where a principle was illustrated by an instance and a particular case seen a coming under a 
principle. If the same principle is used several times in this way leading to different instances, the 
results, put together, would look very like a branching diagram.
31
  The differential diagnosis of the medical record is a good example here and computerized 
versions of this kind of thinking are increasingly being used in clinical medicine including 
psychiatry.
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disagreement by making a change in or a comment on the diagram. [See 
Illustration #1] 
Finally, it is a good way to indicate  proposed changes in the law. Two 
alternative diagrams can be compared to show the differences between an 
existing and a proposed system.  [See Illustration #2]
Other available formal devices –decisional logics
Difficult decisions commonly require balancing or weighing of competing 
values or policies against one another. In medicine, the various factors to be 
considered in making a decision are often listed and these lists are used for all sorts 
of purposes. They can be used to select the most likely diagnosis; to decide 
whether to treat a condition medically or surgically; or to help in making the best 
choice of medications for a particular patient. Factor lists are also used in business, 
e.g., to help select the most appropriate short list of applicants for a particular job; 
or to decide at what point to buy or sell shares. Factor analysis is regularly used in 
legal texts, especially Restatements of the Law, at points where decisions must be 
made. John Austin would hardly agree with this since in his view giving someone 
discretion to make a choice was like giving them a blank check; there is nothing 
more to be said and no possible objection that can be made once the choice is 
made. 32 One can see why Austin, from the perspective of laws as commands, 
adopted this unfettered view of discretion. One can also see why Ronald Dworkin 
and others have rejected it, and their arguments seem sound. Decisions are not 
often made in a vacuum with absolute unlimited license to do what one pleases: in 
most cases there is an expectation that the person given the power to decide will 
exert themselves to make a good decision, or at least the best choice that seems 
open to them at the time. And the appropriateness or otherwise of the decision can 
be measured against the known objectives of the choice. Legal authors therefore, 
in situations where choices must be made, commonly list a number of factors to be 
taken into consideration. These can be used in deciding, for example, whether the 
smelly factory should be moved elsewhere; or its owners made to compensate the 
surrounding home owners for reducing the value of their property ; or to pay the 
costs of moving them away from the nuisance. In like manner, Professor Aaron 
Twerski has listed ten factors to be considered in deciding whether or not to submit 
a design defect question to a jury.33 Unfortunately, in legal texts, the factors are not 
likely to be helpful since they are simply listed without any instructions as to how 
they should be used. The medical profession and the business community go 
beyond this, providing ways of putting the factors together to create a decision-
making apparatus. There are two basic ways of doing this. 
32 Austin is not saying that factors do not enter into a decision, or denying that some decisions are 
better made than others. He is simply saying if a valid discretionary power is used, it is not the 
business of Jurisprudence to say that it could have been used better. This position is, of course, 
open to the same objections as his view of judicial legislation. 
33
 Professor Twerski included this list in an earlier edition of the Henderson  & Twerski products 
liability case book as a possible solution to the problem of ”design by jury”. It was omitted in later 
editions for reasons unknown.
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(1) They can be divided into major and minor factors with a formula provided to 
put them together in a decisional apparatus. These are known as weighted 
factor systems since the major factors weigh more heavily in the decision 
making process. This method is used in the DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (currently DSM-IV), to help decide which is the 
most appropriate diagnostic category for a particular set of symptoms. The 
diagnostic formula for dementia of the Alzheimer’s type (DAT) makes the finding 
of recent memory impairment the one essential major factor. The diagnosis of 
DAT is then confirmed by the presence of one or more of four minor factors.34
(2) The factors can be roughly quantified by assigning number values to each of 
them and adding the resulting numbers together to obtain a total sum. These are 
called scored factor systems. A simple way of doing this is to assign  the 
numbers 0, +1, or +2 to each factor depending on whether they are definitely 
absent (0), doubtfully present (+1), or clearly present (+2). The numbers 
assigned to each factor are then summed to provide a total score that can be 
used to assist decision making.  Scored factor systems are frequently used in 
clinical medicine and in business. They are not normally considered capable of 
making decisions without human input; they only assist in the deciding process, 
generally confirming the intuitive perceptions of the user or perhaps focusing 
attention on the best options. More sophisticated scoring systems can identify 
the best options even more clearly.35
The use of formalism in clearing up tangled jurisprudential differences
Complicated jurisprudential arguments could in most cases be clarified 
and in many cases resolved by formal representation of the opposing points of 
view. The modern debate between the advocates of descriptive jurisprudence 
and their critics is a good example. It is a very complex matter where it is easy for 
the opposing sides to misunderstand and misrepresent one another. It takes its 
origin from different interpretations of Austin’s famous dictum that “the law is one 
thing, its goodness or badness is another”. This apparently clear statement, 
however, is capable of a number of interpretations. It has been taken to mean 
that positive law is a set of commands with no values attached to them. This view 
of law, that there could be rules without values is, from a language/logic 
perspective, an impossibility: and it is very doubtful that Austin intended any such 
thing. Strictly construed, he is only saying that values are not to be used, at least 
in Jurisprudence, to criticize or attempt to improve the law. More perceptive 
critics therefore complain that while Austin may acknowledge that values are 
34 DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 4th edn.  American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994. p.142. The DSM system is, of course, a great deal more sophisticated than 
this simple item would suggest.
35
 Early medical diagnostic software was notoriously inaccurate but current systems are achieving 
sophistication to the point that it may be considered malpractice not to consult them.  Similarly 
early chess software has been replaced by programs such as Big Blue which can defeat world 
champions. Computer diagnostics for automobiles have also become very sophisticated.
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needed for law to function well, he has removed them from the description of the 
law itself into the realm of legislation. They are not embedded in the structure of 
the law, and therefore outside the business of Jurisprudence.36 This argument 
might carry against Austin, but his modern supporters have modified his views. 
They are willing to concede that moral and policy notions are indeed part of the 
substance of the law, but assert that they are factual rather than value 
statements. In descriptive jurisprudence, we are told, values are like the other 
constituent parts of the legal apparatus; they do not need to be justified. It is not 
implied that anyone ought to feel any obligation to follow them in practice. A legal 
writer may note, for example, that the following (named) values37 are in fact 
present in the law of private nuisance and are used to apply the law to cases; but 
it is not thereby implied that the author personally accepts these values or is 
recommending them to anyone as true or valid.38
This view significantly deviates from the traditional view of lawyers about 
the moral values of the law and has not surprisingly drawn criticism from several 
quarters. As Neil McCormick has pointed out39, it takes an external as opposed 
to an internal view of moral notions in the law and it does seem odd. It might be 
appropriate in interpreting law to non-human visitors from a distant planet, but 
seems odd when dealing with people, lawyers and lay persons alike, who tend to 
have, and generally require, an internal view of legal values.40 This is particularly 
the case with judges and advocates who are expected to do more than describe 
the law; they must also, at all times, recommend its observance and, on 
appropriate occasions, seek to improve it. And this is not only in their political 
capacity as citizens but, more importantly, as the custodians of the law.41
This debate is clearly very complex and is just asking for formal 
clarification. [See Appendix] The various parties have made numerous and 
valuable points in the course of their arguments, but neither makes it really clear 
how value propositions function in the legal apparatus.  Dworkin has provided 
examples of cases where the court refused to go along with well established 
existing law because it seemed morally wrong; but when and how this drastic 
step is to be considered is not explained. Hart on the other hand acknowledges 
36
 This is the gist of Ronald Dworkin’s major criticism of legal positivism. Dworkin’s argument is 
that moral values are used by courts to decide cases even, in some cases, when the rules of the 
jurisdictions seem contrary to them.  See TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, Harvard UP 1977, p. 23
37 The paired values here are that ownership gives the right to use, enjoy and even destroy ones 
property (uti, fruere et destruere) but not so as to interfere with the same rights on the part of 
ones neighbor (sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas”). 
38
 Hart terms this approach descriptive as opposed to evaluative jurisprudence. Op cit. p239 ff.
39 LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY (1978), pp.63-64,139-40
40
 Further discussion of this question requires consideration of the doctrine of Natural Law which I 
have discussed elsewhere and especially in Bowser R & McQuade JS,  Marketing Natural Law. 
Campbell Law Review Fall 2004  p
41
 Savigny FC.  See THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGISLATION. Reprint 
London (2000) p 145 ff where the author describes the legal profession as a collective (collegium) 
entrusted with both with the scientific organization and the improvement of the law.
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that value propositions are part of the law, but is equally unhelpful as to their 
place in the legal apparatus.
The formal tripartite model provided by Wittgenstein and illustrated earlier, 
seems to supply these deficiencies and clear up this set of problems. Law can be 
viewed from this perspective, according to the diagram shown previously, as (1) 
an apparatus of legal terms (2) which can be applied to disputes or potential 
disputes (3) in order to achieve certain ends. 
The primary locus for values is clearly in the third part. 42 The values of the 
law, whether moral principles or policies of one sort or other, are the objectives to 
be achieved in each application of the law. In the (rare) easy cases there is only 
one value or all the relevant goals may be substantially met without having to 
sacrifice one to the others. In such cases, values will probably not be mentioned 
in the opinion, and it might seem that they are not required: but they are always 
present by implication. 43 If there is more than one relevant value, as is commonly 
the case, and if they conflict with one another, as they often do, then values will 
normally be noted and some balance must be struck between them.44
In difficult cases, some or all of the relevant values may have to be 
compromised. In very hard cases there may seem to be no good way out and we 
must do the best that we can. Plato describes justice as a harmony, like the 
tuning of a lyre with each string at its proper length. Perfect justice is when all the 
values are fully realized.45 In the real world, of course, next-best solutions are 
usual.46
Values then guide the application of the law. They may also be used to 
critique legislation or judicial decisions, considering whether they further the 
professed objectives of that part of the law or not.. But clearly, both as guide 
posts and measuring rods, they are part of the logical apparatus of the law, 
essential both to its administration and its improvement.
PART IV   THE NOTION OF SCIENCE AND OF LEGAL SCIENCE
A.  VARIATIONS IN THE MEANING OF THE TERM SCIENCE
42
  It might appear that values may also be found in the actual apparatus of the law in the form of 
decisional games, but the factors used here are not values but rather factual considerations 
which point in the direction of certain values.
43 This implied presence of values in simple cases is not taken into account by Roy Stone, who 
opines that values are only important in establishing a legal rule, but thereafter can be ignored. 
See The Compleat Wrangler, 50 Minnesota  LR 1001 (1966)
44
 Probably what Dworkin intends when he says that principles, unlike rules, must be weighed.
45
 Republic Bk IV where temperance and justice are described as being harmonies, a condition 
where the different elements in the state and in the individual maintain their proper place.
46
 E.L Allen, a well known philosophical writer of a previous generation, in a series of lectures on 
Ethics, delivered in Belfast in 1952,  commenting on the statement that politics is the art of the 
second best, opined that in practical politics one may be very happy to get the eleventh best.
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Changing models of scientific method
The term science implies knowledge as opposed to mere opinion and, like 
the medieval term ratio it can be used to indicate a systematic way of studying 
something or, derivatively, an organized body of knowledge that is the product of 
systematic study.47  But both method and product have been viewed rather 
differently in different ages. This is due to the fact that when a particular kind of 
science is seen as being very successful or promising at any particular time, it 
tends to be taken as a model to which all scientific enterprises should conform. 
Broadly speaking there have been three major models of scientific method, each 
of which supported quite different views as to whether any particular branch of 
learning was or was not scientific. These are the geometrical model,48 the 
empirical model and the game- theory (computer) model. These perceptions of 
scientific method have persisted, in many cases beyond their usefulness, into 
modern thinking. It may therefore be worth while do describe them briefly , 
hopefully avoiding the accusation of teaching grandmother how to suck eggs.
Science as deduction
The geometrical model, favored by Plato for its certainty, was dominant in 
the middle ages and focused attention on the formal branches of learning such 
as geometry and logic. Observation was considered to be inferior to logical 
thinking in its ability to reach truth: you do not study the properties of a triangle by 
looking at actual triangles but by thinking about the concept of a triangle and 
making deductions from it. The empirical sciences, if they were thought possible 
at all, were treated as second class citizens. The only known kind of study of 
physical things, where anything remotely like mathematics seemed to apply, was 
astronomy, since the paths of the heavenly bodies could be regarded as 
geometrical patterns, though imperfect ones. The unreliability of observational 
science was attributed to the fact that on earth the intellectual things (which alone 
could be certainly known) were mixed up with matter which was obviously 
unintellectual or even anti-intellectual. The heavenly bodies, high above the 
earth, were thought to be less material, so that their intellectual content was more 
prominent. This view was sometimes expressed in the dictum that there could be 
no science concerning anything that was nearer to the earth than the moon. The 
geometrical model has been largely absorbed into the mathematical view of 
science and can hardly be recommended in its original form. It can however be 
quite easily restated in language/logic terms as will appear later.
47
 The term ratio was used by the scholastics as a general term to include the faculty of reason, 
and the process of reasoning. It would seem that among medieval lawyers it was taken to mean 
the product of reasoning, an organized body of learning. See McQuade JS, Medieval ratio and 
modern formal studies. 38 American Journal of Jurisprudence (1993) 359
48
 The mathematical model will be included under this heading, which was the view of  the early 
mathematical scientists such as Galileo and Newton.  Other versions of the mathematical model 
may also be classified as particular forms of game theory.
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Mathematical science
The possibility of sublunar science was considered by some great 
medieval thinkers, notably Robert Grosseteste,49 who expanded Aristotle's logic 
to include such things.50 Grosseteste's work was taken up in Italy and the first 
steps made towards a scientific knowledge of material things with Galileo's 
mechanics. Galileo, and those who followed him, showed that mathematical 
formulae could be used to represent physical events and it came to be felt that 
this was science “properly so called”..51 Descartes, reflecting on Galileo's work, 
divided "things" into mental and material things. Material things boil down, he 
said, have two essential properties, namely extension (dimension) and 
movement. Both of these can be represented by numbers or algebraic formulae 
and so are proper objects of scientific study. Mental things cannot be measured 
and so, Descartes concluded, cannot be studied scientifically.
A number of philosophers following Descartes agreed with his views 
regarding physical objects but did not accept that there could be no mental 
science: and the advent of statistical mathematics was to prove them right. The 
social sciences, after a slow start, progressed rapidly in the earlier part of the 
twentieth century and powerfully affected legal theory. The methods and findings 
of social science had a central place in the thinking of the American Legal 
Realists. Even those who, like Pound, believed that jurisprudence was not a 
positive science, were well aware that the work of social scientists could be 
extremely relevant to lawyers and to legal theory.
The radical empiricist view of science – scientific positivism
The spectacular success of the science of "things" during the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries led to an emphasis on observation and the revival 
of strict empiricism, the notion that knowledge is based on facts; and facts are 
what we perceive by our senses. The previous situation, where information 
obtained by the senses was despised, was now reversed and information from 
any other quarter was considered inferior. The most reliable empirical evidence 
was the repeatable experiment. This would have test-retest reliability, uniformly 
producing the same results. It would also be expected to have inter-rater 
reliability, with uniform results regardless of who conducted the experiment. The 
term "science" was thus restricted to the most exact of the physical sciences. 
Researchers here practiced science properly so called; others such as social 
scientists or historians, might be described as scientists but only, as Austin might 
say, by analogy.
49
 Bishop of Lincoln in the first part of the13th century.
50
 See McEvoy J, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROBERT GROSSETESTE, Oxford 1982, p.206 ff.
51
 This mathematical approach to science has persisted into modern times Medical pundits were 
accustomed to express this point of view, emphatically if ungrammatically, by saying that if you 
don’t got numbers you don’t got nothin’.
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Radical empiricism, however laudable as a method in certain of the hard 
sciences,52 was a rather naive philosophy of knowledge; and all sorts of 
problems became apparent as philosophers began to think seriously about it.  
David Hume’s ultimate conclusions on this matter can be summarized by saying 
that if we only know what we perceive, we do not know very much. The existence 
of things external to our minds, of minds other than our own and even our own 
existence as persons (other than the sights and sounds that we are hearing or 
seeing or remembering at a particular moment in time) are very doubtful 
propositions indeed on empiricist principles.53 More importantly, creative thinkers 
do not operate this way either as scientists or in any other form of study. It is true 
that armchair speculations without observations are not likely to take one very 
far, but it is also true that fruitful scientific research is unlikely to be carried out 
with any degree of success by people who are afraid of speculating.
Radical empiricism therefore had to make way for theories which would 
bring together the rational and the observational aspects of science, and these 
became more persuasive in the present century with the dissemination of more 
adequate accounts of the nature of mathematics and especially with the 
development of game theory.
Science as the application of symbolic games to problems
Contemporary models of science treat scientific knowledge as applied 
calculus, where sets of symbols of all kinds are used to represent and explain 
phenomena. These may be algebraic formulae, or icons or specially defined 
words (or letter abbreviations for words) put together in a system.54 This 
approach sees science of every kind as the application of formal systems to data. 
Like all methodological prescriptions it should not be taken to apply everywhere 
in exactly the same way for all purposes. The general notion of applied game 
theory will take different forms in different disciplines. The methods that are 
suitable for experimental chemistry will not be apt for observational sciences 
such as astronomy. Each discipline must then find or develop its own calculus 
systems; design protocols to govern the application; and indicate the ends or 
goals that it seeks to achieve. This is clearly the case for the physical sciences, 
but holds good in other areas also. The study of history is certainly not ordinarily 
experimental55 but explanations, often in the form of descriptive narratives, are 
52
 This was Herman Oliphant’s comment, avoiding the philosophical problems of radical 
empiricism, but still wishing to stick close to the facts with little in the way of theory. Whether one 
can take advantage of a defective theory by classifying it as a method seems doubtful. See 
Oliphant H, A return to stare decisis. 14 American Bar Association Journal (1928) p.71
53
 See his chapter on Skepticism with regard to the senses, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE , Bk.I, 
Mentor Books N.Y. (1962 ) p.288.
54
 Chemical reactions, for example, can be represented by any or all of these kinds of symbols. 
55
 Experiments, such as the voyage of the Kon-Tiki across the pacific, may be undertaken to 
show that a historical theory was physically possible.
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applied to known facts to achieve credibility.56 Ethics too may be undertaken as 
the organization of a set of consistent perceptions as to whether things are right 
or wrong (or good and bad).57  Provided the entity, for which an application is 
being attempted, has regularity of some sort or other, appropriate calculus may 
be found or developed, and applied to achieve whatever goals may seem 
appropriate. 
Applying these considerations to the study of law generally, it can be seen 
that virtually any kind of enquiry that a thoughtful lawyer might undertake, could 
and should be undertaken scientifically.58 But it is being argued here that the 
backbone of legal studies, the organization of statutory, regulatory and case 
materials into consistent systems of law, is essentially the development of 
calculus systems for legal purposes and that Jurisprudence, in that sense, is 
indeed a science in the strictest sense of the word. It is not the less scientific 
because it cannot be managed like physical science any more than poetry is not 
art because it is not working with physical materials as in painting or sculpture.
Analytical jurisprudence clearly is or can be a scientific activity in the 
sense defined above. But this notion must be further explained and some 
additional questions answered before it can be accepted and put to use in the 
law.
B. ANALYTICAL JURISPRUDENCE AS LEGAL SCIENCE
Finding the “Province” of Jurisprudence - the “field theory” problem
The original term for scientific enquiry was philosophy, a blanket term that 
covered every type of enquiry into truth.59 Plato indeed made this point 60 stating 
that the philosopher loves truth of all kinds. But, as knowledge accumulated, it 
became convenient, indeed necessary, to treat different topics or areas of 
knowledge separately and so the “field” theory was born. Natural philosophy, 
history and all sorts of particular kinds of study were thus designated as separate 
fields, which together presumably comprise “the estate” of academic knowledge. 
Universities came to mirror these divisions in their departments and sub-divisions 
within departments. Specialization in one or other of these subdivisions was 
inevitable and not long in coming. This allowed greater expertise to develop but 
also had the unfortunate result that each department, and sometimes individual 
56
 Historical research has been likened to assembling a jigsaw puzzle with some of the pieces missing. The 
objective is to see which arrangement makes the most plausible picture.
57
 Some have considered this a simple word game with only two terms, “good” and “bad”; but 
when excuses are taken into consideration, it can require quite a complex calculus system.
58 Even determining the “facts” of a case is the application of historical method, seeing which story 
best describes the evidence.
59
 The term “wisdom” in the Proverbs of Solomon approaches this notion. Solomon’s wisdom 
included speaking about trees, beasts, birds, reptiles and fish. Probably one should add the study 
of insects, given the  references in the book of Proverbs to ants and bees.
60 THE REPUBLIC Trans. Jowett. (474b-480a).
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researchers within the same general area, became less aware of what the others 
were doing. Another consequence was that it came to be felt that, in order to be 
recognized as a scientist, or to have study of a certain kind recognized as being 
scientific, one had to show exclusive title to a piece of the estate. Thus, 
investigators in a particular area had to (or felt obliged to) show that their studies 
and investigations constituted a distinct scientific field and should be allotted a 
place in the map. This has been a persistent attitude among legal scholars. 
Austin entitled his work the Province of Jurisprudence Determined and spent a 
good deal of time distinguishing Jurisprudence from other studies such as ethics. 
Hans Kelsen likewise developed his Pure Theory of Law, distinguishing it from 
other approaches such as the sociology of law. The truth of the matter is that the 
boundaries between the “fields” are conventional only, and that they become 
progressively less important as investigations proceed. Special areas of study 
remain but there is nothing permanent or inevitable about them. They can divide 
up into further sub-groups or be absorbed into another one as convenience 
dictates. The process is analogous to a group of primitive, but philosophical, 
inhabitants investigating the wreckage of a strange flying object which has 
crashed and is scattered all over their island. The initial investigations will be 
local, studying bits and pieces which happen to be located together. As 
knowledge progresses, some of these, originally far apart, may be grouped 
together under the notion of wings, cabin, engines and so on. Still later it may be 
necessary to consider systems such as electrical wiring, navigation, propulsion, 
and communication. In short, the division of labor and classification of the 
problems will alter as the investigations proceed.
Applying these considerations to the study of law, there is no clearly 
distinguishable and completely separate field of study for jurisprudence. Every 
aspect of society and numerous academic studies impinge upon law and may 
need to be considered by legal scholars. The proposal here is that analytical 
jurisprudence is a valuable, perhaps even central, approach to the study of law, 
and that it is scientific in a meaningful sense of the word. But it is not the only 
possible form of legal science nor does it exist in a vacuum, totally separated 
from other kinds of social activity and other academic disciplines. The next great 
step forward in the understanding of law (and so affecting the arrangement of 
legal materials) may be lying unnoticed in the journal of some apparently 
unrelated subject or on the desk of some scholar (perhaps even a philosopher) 
who has no idea that it has any relevance to the study of law. Analysis will not 
function well sealed off in a glass bubble.
Developing a formal methodology for Jurisprudence – renouncing the 
legacy of radical empiricism
Radical empiricism is the doctrine that theory is derived from and should 
remain close to facts with the very minimum of speculation. As applied to law this 
meant that rules (however defined) must somehow be extracted from the basic 
legal materials in the form of propositions of law. Strict empiricism applied to 
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case law meant that cases (the equivalent of the scientists’ data) must be studied 
to extract from them the rule or rules that they contain; and if ones empiricism is 
really radical, these would have to be the narrowest possible rules that would 
explain the decision.61 Bentham, very much an empiricist, favored such simple 
rules. Whether Austin intended to apply radical empiricism to the study of case 
law or anything else must be a matter for speculation. A good case can be made 
for the idea that he was attracted by Hume’s view of science and especially his 
version of the central notion of causation. Austin’s analysis of law into 
commands, with requests coupled by threats leading to a habit of obedience, has 
an attractive resemblance to Hume’s associationism where constant conjunction 
of events leads to a habit of expecting one when we see the other. But if Austin 
was initially attracted by this idea, it is clear that he had serious questions on this 
subject.62 The point is moot, however, for the enthusiasm for empiricist 
epistemology grew apace after his death and his works tended to be interpreted 
from that perspective. He was credited with the idea that legal theory could be 
extracted from legal materials much as theories were empirically “found” in 
physical data by physicists and chemists. Bentham’s notion of the infima species
was part of this intellectual environment, and so the search for the ratio decidendi
of each case, as the narrowest proposition of law required to decide it, was on. 
Langdell is known to have greatly admired Austin and his case book method, 
finding the law in leading cases, is very much in this philosophical tradition.
Strict empiricist notions are no longer dominant or even favored among 
contemporary philosophers or scientific investigators. Imagination and creativity 
in thinking are encouraged and the formulation of bold hypotheses is seen as the 
most likely way to make progress. This is not the same thing as idle speculation. 
Hypotheses must be turned this way and that and checked in every detail for 
reliability. But what is being checked is not whether a proposed hypothesis is the 
narrowest and sole way of organizing the facts but rather whether it is the most 
reliable63 fit; and it is especially important to show that there is no other notion 
which fares better. The narrowest construct is not necessarily the best.
In short it would seem that the theory is brought to the facts, not found in 
them. This is rather like the medieval view of legal theory, where the law was 
61
 The famous infima species.
62
 The works of Kant are well represented in his library according to the list of his books donated 
by his widow to the Inner Temple. Unfortunately the books themselves are lost, and along with 
them Austin’s marginal notes, so that we cannot tell what he thought about Kant or how far 
Kantian notions may have affected his earlier enthusiasm for empiricism. It is true that his 
Benthamite background and associations might suggest that he had been, at least initially, in 
favor of strict empiricism. However, he abandoned or reinterpreted a number of Bentham’s 
notions as his own thought developed, and he is quite likely to have changed his earlier opinions 
to the extent of having doubts about them if not so as to replace them with any others. 
63
 Reliability here is a technical term and includes a number of things, including not only the ability 
of a construct to explain known facts but also its congruence with already existing established 
theories.
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viewed as a logical structure which could be illustrated by the cases.64 It has 
been argued that the term ratio, which can refer both to the faculty of reason and 
the process of reasoning, was also used by medieval lawyers to refer to an 
organized body of law, the product of systematic investigation. “The law says” 
and “reason says” could therefore be regarded as equivalent expressions.65 This 
view of the law as system illustrated by cases persisted in the legal tradition long 
after the technical notion of “ratio” was forgotten. The governing council of the 
University of London, in establishing the study of law there, issued a statement 
expressing the hope, among other things, that the teacher of law there might 
learn “to illustrate his prelections – by practical discussion of cases actually tried 
in the Courts of London and Westminster – as the Medical teachers explain the 
practical applications of their science by Clinical Lessons.66 This plan was taken 
by Rumford to anticipate the case book method introduced in the Harvard Law 
School by Langdell.67 But this is not so. Langdell, an admirer of Austin and an 
advocate of legal science (modern style) was teaching his students to find the 
law in the cases. The governing council were rather restating the older view that 
the law is brought to the cases, not found in them. The cases show how the law 
has been applied, interpreted and even on occasion changed in the courts. But a 
case without a preexisting legal calculus being applied in the court, however 
crude that calculus may be, is a non-entity which may be thought to have existed 
at some time in pre-history but has never been encountered in fact. It is like the 
uninterpreted primary visual data of the empiricist philosophers, the ultimate 
colors and sounds and touches and tastes of experience. Such things almost 
certainly exist but there is no way that we can be aware of them as independently 
existing things. They come to us already identified as chairs, houses, barns and 
cows. Sights and smells and sounds may not always be identified, but in this 
form they are vague and hover on the margins of experience in a ghostly fashion 
until we can categorize them as sights, sounds, smells and sensations “of 
something”. So legal materials come to us bearing the stamp of some already 
existing system of law. In order to understand legal decisions we must then 
identify the legal apparatus that was used to decide them.
The business of the legal profession is not then to find the law but to 
organize it formally; to develop the symbolic games, produce protocols for their 
application and provide appropriate ends and goals which the law may be 
expected to achieve. In these terms law can be defined as sets of calculus 
applied to disputes to produce that harmony of values which may be called 
64
 Lord Mansfield, stated that precedents are “evidences and examples of what the law is.” See  
C.K. Allen LAW IN THE MAKING 7th ed. (Oxford 1963) p.217. This view represents the Civil Law 
attitude to precedent cases with which Lord Mansfield was very familiar. 
65
 William Noy, writing in 1577, wrote “The Common Law is grounded  on the rules of reason, and 
therefore we say in argument that reason wills that such a thing be done or that reason wills that 
such a thing shall not be done.” Elsewhere he remarks that “reason says” and “the law says” 
amount to much the same thing. Noy W, MAXIMS OF THE ENGLISH LAW (1808 ed.) p.1
66
 Quoted by Belot, UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON 1826-1926 (1929),  p.47. Cited also by Rumford 
WE THE THOUGHT OF JOHN AUSTIN London (1985), p.29
67
 Rumford WE, Op. Cit. p.29
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justice. And we may add, with Savigny, that it is also the business of the legal 
community to keep reviewing and improving these legal games to keep them in 
touch with changing circumstances and ideas.
Analytical Jurisprudence as a normative science.
John Austin could not have lived in the intellectual environment of the first 
half of the nineteenth century without experiencing the enormous prestige 
associated with the developing natural sciences. And in the circle of advanced 
radical thinkers, among whom he was an esteemed member (at least in his 
earlier years) he must have felt the attractions of science based on factual 
information as a model for Jurisprudence. He also inherited a fact-based model 
of law from Thomas Hobbes. It would naturally have been a very appealing idea 
to Austin, as it was to many of the legal realists in the nineteenth century, to 
model legal science along these lines.  There are indeed a number of indications,  
that Austin was tempted by, or may even have bought into the notion of 
jurisprudence as a quasi-physical science.  In the main, however, his discussion 
remains in the mainstream of that legal tradition which holds that laws are norms, 
things ordered to be done, not existing things. They are enacted by the proper 
agencies with the idea that society will in fact conform to them; but this does not 
necessarily happen. Most modern interpreters of Austin have opted for a 
normative Jurisprudence. So when H.L.A. Hart speaks of descriptive 
jurisprudence, he is describing norms, not what actually happens in society.   
The nature of legal values –  Natural Law theory
All parties seem to agree that moral values (including in that term policies) 
are essential parts of the structure of the law but there is considerable confusion 
as to their nature. Lawyers are traditionally uncomfortable with moral discussion
and prefer either to get rid of it altogether (the law is the law) or have moral 
propositions so incontrovertible that there is nothing to discuss. Unfortunately 
such expedients are like the little Dutch boy plugging the hole in the dike with his 
finger; moral questions, like the North Sea, eventually pour in. If moral value 
cannot be excluded, the next option is to tame it, to make it more factual and 
suitable for open argument in court. The two most notable proposals of this 
nature which are currently favored in legal theory are Bentham’s utilitarianism 
and, more recently, the social contract theory of John Rawls. Both of these have 
proved defective and for the same reason. You cannot build the humane values 
that the law requires on a non-moral foundation.68  The only remaining viable 
candidate appears to be Natural Law  theory, the notion that there are moral 
68 Bentham’s pleasure/pain has all sorts of difficulties but especially that it fails to guarantee good 
treatment of minorities and also does not provide a good reason why individuals should favor a 
benefit to society which is to their own disadvantage. Rawls’ major difficulties arise from his 
acceptance of rational self interest as the deciding principle of each party to the agreement. it is 
impossible to get to the sort of humane values that he favors from this essentially self centered 
premiss. As one of his critics remarked, “you can’t get there from here.”
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principles of right and wrong which are valid everywhere, in all ages and by 
everyone (ubique, ibique et ab omnibus). There has been a considerable revival 
of interest in Natural Law since the sixties (for obvious reasons) but some 
persisting objections and, more importantly, reservations in the minds of rights 
interest groups, have prevented its reinstatement as the formal moral foundation 
of law. Most of these objections and fears are due, as Professor Finnis has 
pointed out, to misunderstandings of the theory, especially the notion that it  
implies that all value judgments are fixed and indisputable. In the classical 
versions of Natural Law, especially that of St. Thomas Aquinas, only the main 
principles remain constant. As we descend through progressively less general 
principles, more and more exceptions will be found and the derived moral notions 
will also be subject to mutation with the passage of time and changes in 
circumstances and even altered ways of thinking. The most serious problem is 
not then that Natural Law notions are too fixed, but rather that in particular 
instances they are too flexible, with too much room for disagreement. At any one
time, indeed, it is unlikely that agreement will be reached as to the right rule of 
conduct except in very clear cases. So beside the fact that values may conflict, 
there is also the problem that they may be too general and may need to scaled 
down into more particular and usable propositions. Thus the value of aiming at 
good affordable housing might easily be deduced from the social principles of 
Natural Law, but the precise standards by which the adequacy of rental houses 
should be assessed will not follow logically from first principles, but will depend 
on many economic and other social variables in the actual situation. Another 
difficulty, and a common one in law, is that more than one value may be involved 
and they may conflict with one another. In such cases, some or all values may 
have to be compromised to some extent. In very hard cases there may seem to 
be no good way out and we must do the best that we can. Plato describes justice 
as a harmony, like the tuning of a stringed instrument so that each string is its 
proper length. Perfect justice then would be when all the values are fully 
realized.69 In the real world, of course, next-best solutions are usual.70
The legal profession then, has not only the duty of providing and updating 
calculus systems, but also the further task of developing sets of value systems 
for them. These should be particular enough to be usable but must also 
command widespread if not universal agreement. The maxims of the law 
admirably performed this function. They were not, as medieval lawyers 
sometimes supposed, axioms of natural law, but derived principles, capable of 
directing courts considering particular cases in the right direction. 71 We may need 
to develop new maxims, but in many cases the traditional ones translate well into 
69
 Republic Bk IV where temperance and justice are described as being harmonies, a condition where the 
different elements in the state and in the individual are each given and remain in their proper place.
70
 E.L Allen,  in a series of lectures on Biblical Ethics, delivered in Belfast in 1952,  commenting on the 
statement that politics is the art of the second best, remarked that in practical politics one may be very 
happy to get the eleventh best.
71
 I have discussed the maxims of the law in several articles but especially in Ancient Legal Maxims and 
Modern Human Rights. 18 Campbell Law Review (1996), 75. A short list of  better known maxims is 
added, e.g. qui peccat ebrius, luat sobrius (injure drunk,  pay sober).
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modern circumstances. Some (a very few) are completely outdated, but the vast 
majority only need to be reinterpreted and rendered apt for modern 
circumstances by showing how they might be applied in different types of cases. 
Indeed the maxims, considered as guiding principles, cannot be understood 
without considering examples of their application in case law. This was precisely 
the method by which Noy, Coke and especially Bacon expounded them.
The problem of desuetude
A major problem with a normative science of law is the status, if any, of 
laws which have been properly made and never repealed or replaced, but which 
are generally recognized as obsolete to the point that no reasonable person 
would dream of enforcing them. The strict normative position would be that these 
are valid laws whether they are being enforced or not. Authors, like Kelsen, who 
base law on custom, (its being received as law by the great majority of the 
populace), will say that the law has lapsed by desuetude, being ignored and not 
accepted as law by most people. Those who, with Hart, emphasize the custom of 
the legal profession rather than the general population, might hold that 
enactments which are treated as anachronisms by the legal profession so that no 
right thinking legal official would dream of enforcing, should be regarded as being 
lapsed by reason of desuetude, negative custom, and no longer law. 72
Generally speaking the courts accept the normative view that an obsolete 
law is still law, but will try very hard, and probably succeed, in refusing to enforce 
it. 73 So far as descriptive jurisprudence is concerned, obsolete laws could be 
regarded as valid, but with some kind of a notation to show that they were 
deemed anachronistic and so unenforceable. 
Some applications of formalism in legal education, writing and practice
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 A version of the notion of desuetude which was argued, and in a number of cases accepted by 
the courts, was that where a law was on the books but no writs based upon it had been issued by 
the chancery, the statute was void. This view was, however, finally rejected by courts in England . 
The main point in the argument against it is that time could not be argued against the Crown and 
so statutes could  never lapse by failure to observe or implement them over any period of time.
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 For a list of such obsolete laws see Allen CK,  LAW IN THE MAKING. Oxford 1964. p. 478 ff.. The 
Anglo-Saxon law of deodands allowed the article which caused the accidental or negligent death 
of someone to be forfeit to their family. The forfeit was later allocated to the Church to pay for 
masses on behalf of the deceased and finally to the crown who were supposed to apply it for the 
benefit of the deceased’s family. In the case of Regina v Western Ry Co. 10 M & W 58 (Exch. 
1845)  a railway accident caused the deaths of four people. The crown claimed that the value of 
the train should be multiplied by four to provide for each death. The railway claimed that the 
assessed value of the train covered all four deaths. The court found for the Crown. These railway 
cases were becoming frequent and threatening to bankrupt defendants. The law of deodands 
was deemed obsolete and abolished in England by statute the following year (9 & 10 Victoria 
1846). Its apparent irrationality may have been deceptive since there had never been any 
recovery by the family of the deceased other than by the law of deodands. This situation was 
rectified in 1850 by Lord Campbell’s Act allowing  recovery by the immediate family for loss 
occasioned by a wrongful death.
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Switching over from methods and practices based on outdated notions of 
science to those based on modern logics, would provide a number of techniques 
which the law could use to advantage..
Providing a better model for the analysis of cases. The notion of the ratio 
decidendi as the narrowest proposition required to decide the case is 
probably dead or at least at death’s door.74 But its ghost lingers on in legal 
research generally and in legal research courses in particular. When we ask 
what a case decides, the answer is commonly a proposition. The better 
method, in full modern formal dress, would be to identify the pieces of 
apparatus (legal calculus) selected by the court as relevant to the case; to 
show how they were applied to the facts in the case; and what ends and 
goals (legal values) were used to guide the application. This full or complete 
answer is, of course, seldom required. The case may well turn on the use of a 
single element in the apparatus, the others being satisfied or otherwise 
irrelevant. In such cases it would be tedious and unnecessary for the judges 
to begin by laying out the entire structural form. Nevertheless, the total 
system is there by implication and should be kept in mind even if not explicitly 
mentioned. A more complete review of a decision might consider whether 
some of the other elements should have been considered or even whether 
the court should have looked at some other totally different piece of legal 
apparatus which was relevant to the case.75  This method also formalizes 
discussion of whether the case was well decided or not; considering whether 
and how far it advanced the stated values and objectives of that part of the 
law. 
Improving classroom teaching methods. From the formalist perspective, it 
would appear that the classical case book class room method, is flawed. The 
student prepares by studying the case report and is then expected to find a 
way through the facts and the opinion to the ruling in the case. In this process 
the relevant law must be found somewhere, which can be a difficult task given 
only the usual class materials. If the first item in those materials could be an 
organized representation of the law, the remaining items, the cases where it 
was applied, would make more sense. Some might think that it is a good thing 
to make the student hunt around for this vital information. The extra labor is, 
however, irrational, like the Egyptians making the Israelites find their own 
straw to make bricks. Time would be better spent in mastering the appropriate 
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 See exchanges between Professor J.L.Montrose and  A.W.B. Simpson in 20 Modern Law 
Review (1946). The contending authors do not agree on what actually is binding in a precedent 
case (material facts, judicial opinion, implied judicial opinion). Fascinating questions  are raised 
(but not answered) about decisions where several judges concur on the same case but give 
different reasoning. See especially J.L. Montrose, “The ratio decidendi and the House of Lords.” 
20 Mod. L.Rev. (1946) p.124
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 One publisher, whose work had been taken and used without permission by a rival company, 
advised his lawyers that they were making a mistake in suing under breach of copyright. The 
proper cause of action, since the defendant’s publication was commissioned  by the government, 
was not in breach of copyright, but  in eminent domain.
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legal apparatus, preferably in a good formal arrangement, and then seeing 
how it is and should be applied in the assigned cases. 
Improving the writing of judicial opinions. A judicial opinion is intended to  
explain or justify the processes by which the judge decided the case. It should 
of course identify the areas of law in which the case is supposed to sound, 
the particular rules that are deemed relevant and the way in which they were 
applied to the facts of the case. This formal effort is not needed in every case 
and perhaps only in important or unusual ones. Easy cases, where the law 
and its application are obvious will probably not reach the appellate courts 
and will not therefore be reported. If the result is very obvious the case should 
not reach the courts at all. Good formal arrangement is more appropriate in 
difficult cases, complex cases and those where the law is being changed or 
applied in a novel way. At the very least in such cases, the relevant legal 
terms should be explicitly noted, defined if necessary, and any change or 
development in the legal apparatus should be clearly and explicitly indicated. 
It will also probably be of importance in such cases to identify the ends or 
goals guiding the application of that part of the law and how any conflict 
between them was resolved. All this is frequently done using the simplest and 
oldest of formal methods, the “and ” and the “or” games deriving from the 
elements in the forms of action at common law.  Decisions where factors are 
weighed and considered do not occur in every case, but where they do, 
weighted or scored factor games might be helpful to the court, both in the 
deciding process and in justifying the conclusions in the eyes of others. 
Algorithms (branching logics), expressing the law in a skeleton form, would be 
useful in two ways. First they would help to ensure that no important item in 
the legal apparatus had been overlooked. Second, they would be useful as 
communication devices since they could indicate, e.g. by circling or otherwise 
drawing attention to items, the points on which the attention of the court has 
been focused. [See Appendix #2] It is not being suggested here that judicial 
opinions be accompanied by branching diagrams or scored factor lists, 
though one might say “why not?. A more acceptable suggestion might be that 
the judicial clerks accompany their briefs to the judges with formal materials 
to make it quite clear what they are saying and, incidentally, to show that they 
have been carrying out their duties in a careful and methodical manner.
Revitalizing legal scholarship. A senior judicial clerk of many years 
experience has recently commented that judges no longer cite nor pay much 
attention to law review articles76. Several possible reasons for this fact, if fact it 
be, could be considered. It is true that many other sources of legal information 
are now available, such as computer research tools and authoritative 
publications (such as Restatements of the Law and Uniform Statutes in the 
U.S.) but it appears that current legal writing is not helpful to those who are 
actually in the business of settling and deciding cases. Much of it is focused 
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 Thomas L Fowler, Law Reviews and Their Relevance to Modern Legal Problems. 24(1) 
Campbell Law Revierw (2002) 47.
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on individual decisions with comment, largely of a political nature, either 
bemoaning or approving the direction the law appears to be taking.  It is at this 
point that studies in descriptive jurisprudence, employing modern formal 
logics, could be helpful. These would review an area of law and present 
analyses of it using formal tools as already described. The branching diagram 
is particularly useful in comparing rules in different jurisdictions or variants of 
the same rule, e.g. a traditional version, a radically new version and perhaps a 
compromise solution. Variant algorithms not only clarify the issues, but are 
also helpful in allowing courts and legislators to decide which of the variant 
rules they should adopt. Competing policies could also be represented by 
factor based decisional logical forms. Review articles covering small areas of 
the law and accompanied by formal representations, actual or proposed, of 
the rules, would surely be helpful to courts and, where appropriate, to 
legislators
SUMMARY AND APPLICATIONS
The main thrust of the preceding arguments is that modern notions of 
logic, especially those deriving from the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
hitherto largely overlooked, would be very helpful in the study and practice of law. 
It has also more particularly been argued that they could revitalize the notion of 
analytical or descriptive jurisprudence.
As to the nature of science and scientific method, it has been argued that 
thinking, and especially scientific thinking, is essentially the application of formal 
games to problem areas in order to achieve certain ends. This view is widely
accepted and is a much more helpful model for legal science than the radical 
empiricism of Austin’s day, or any of the epistemologies, largely modeled on hard 
science, that followed it. Legal practitioners and writers have, indeed, been 
following this method, tacitly, for centuries77, analyzing law in terms of the 
elements in causes of action and using maxims as moral guide posts in their 
interpretation and application.
A variety of formal arrangements have been employed in recent years by 
other professions and disciplines that are very apt for use in legal studies. These 
include the algorithm of computer logic and the decisional logics used in many 
professions including business and clinical medicine. Examples have been 
appended to show how such simple devices could facilitate communication 
between researchers and also aid practitioners in analyzing and disposing of 
cases. 
Third, the application of legal forms can be greatly improved by the use of 
established and well grounded values. The idea that values could not be based 
on anything other than personal preference has had a long innings, and a recent 
renewed turn at bat in the law. But the Law of Nature has been revived recently 
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 Millenia, if the activities of the Roman jurisconsults are included in the reckoning.
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as a foundation for rights doctrines of various kinds. Many of the concerns of 
rights activists about Natural Law rest on misunderstandings of Natural Law 
theory. The main problem, so far as law is concerned, is that the maxims are too 
general to be useful and must be processed in some way to produce more 
particular goals which can offer direction in particular cases. It has been 
suggested that the traditional maxims of the law, updated by linking them to case 
law, could be very helpful here.
Fourth, and finally, it should be made clear that descriptive jurisprudence 
as delineated above is not the only valid approach to the study of law. There is 
no such thing as a completely separate academic field; boundaries are for the 
most part conventional only, depending on which group of questions can be 
conveniently be studied together by the same researchers. Advances in 
understanding are commonly stimulated by an idea from another field, often a 
distant one. This has constantly been happening in Jurisprudence where the 
prevailing notions about scientific method have been used to understand and 
organize law. Descriptive Jurisprudence is bound to be affected by concepts from 
the physical sciences, social sciences, mathematics and especially philosophy. 
Language philosophy, the algorithm from computer science, and decisional 
logics from medicine and business, have been adapted for legal purposes in this 
article. There are no doubt many potentially useful concepts in surrounding 
disciplines just waiting to be noticed and put to work in the formal study of the 
law.
One final point: the logical forms presented here are very simple. This 
constitutes a problem as we tend to ignore or even despise things which are 
simple and prefer those which require expensive equipment and special training. 
Naaman the Syrian captain78 refused Elisha’s cure for his leprosy (dipping seven 
times in the river Jordan) and set off home in a rage. His servant, wiser than his 
master, remonstrated with him saying “if the prophet had asked to do some great 

















































Schema representing the effects of plaintiff misuse of a product 
and suggesting an alternative rule to cover such cases
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Dft only liable for 











Personal history of 
mental disorder






Court required to partition 
mental harms with Dft not 
liable for those attributed 
to Pf’s predisposing 
conditions
Mental harm caused by 
defendant’s actions
In previous schema PF liable for all 
harms here 
Appendix  #2
Schema presenting an option which would require the 
partitioning of mental harms not otherwise separable
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Appendix #3
Schema formalizing the decisional processes in Riggs 
v Palmer intended to clarify the   jurisprudential issues 
raised by that case
Elements required for 
a valid will 
[the “AND” and “OR’” 
games]
Policies  
1. 1.To fulfill intent of 
2. testator                                       
2.. Other public 























Applying a  scored factor decisional system to a design defect case
In Dawson v Chrysler  the plaintiff, a police officer, was injured when his 
patrol car crashed into a metal pole in a culvert.79 The pole pressed into the 
side of the car and the plaintiff was propelled up it to bang into the roof thus 
injuring his neck and rendering him quadriplegic. The proposed design 
change was additional metal in the frame to stiffen it and prevent collapse 
inward. Chrysler argued that stiffening the frame would reduce its ability to 
absorb force in a different kind of accident increasing the likelihood of injury, 
i.e. the alternative design is a polycentric proposal, where changing one 
aspect of a design necessitates other changes.
Twerski listed ten factors to be weighed before submitting a design case 
to the jury: These can be put together in a decisional system using either a 
weighted or a scored method
#1 Polycentric design question. 
[NO = 0, YES = +2, MAYBE = +1]
#2 Are overall risk/benefit advantages of alternative design superior to 
challenged design .
[YES = 0, NO = +2, MAYBE = +1]
#3 State of the art technology available? .
[YES = 0, NO = +2, ? = +1]
#4 Was the harm causally connected to the design used? 
[YES = 0, NO = +2, MAYBE = +1]
#5 Shifting duty: were independent responsible decision makers involved 
in design choices. [NO = 0, YES = +2, MAYBE = +1]
#6 Was the preservation of consumer choice in the item desirable? 
[NO = 0, YES = +2, MAYBE = +1]
#7 Was the danger obvious to the user? 
[NO = 0, YES = +2, MAYBE = +1]
#8 Is the estimated cost of the alternative design too high. 
[NO = 0, YES = +2, MAYBE = +1]
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#9 Was extensive safety review included in the design process. 
[NO = 0, YES = +2, MAYBE = +1]
#10 Were governmental safety regulations incorporated in the design.
[NO = 0, YES = +2, MAYBE = +1]
The scored factor system could be applied as follows.
 Polycentricity +2; close risk/benefit characteristics +1; technology 
available 0; causation doubtful +1;  independent decision makers involved +1; 
consumer choice relevant +1; danger obvious +1; costs of alternative design 
possibly high if gas costs are included +1; probably extensive safety review in 
design process +2; governmental safety regulations probably incorporated in 
design process +2. The total then would be 12 out of a possible score of 20, 
i.e., the result is just above the median line.
Since the summed score is above the median, this suggests that the 
result, though close, favors the defendant. And the fact that an entire line of 
products is in jeopardy might make it desirable that the score should be 
significantly below the median line before the case should be submitted to the 
jury. This might be especially persuasive if a weighted factor system was 
used also since polycentricity would probably be the main or perhaps the sole 
major factor, requiring only the support of a few minor factors. In the opinion 
of  Professor James Henderson, this case was unsuitable for jury 
determination. This was in fact the intuitive feeling of the judge 80
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 See opinion of Adams CJ in Dawson. See also Henderson, Judicial review of 
Manufacturers’ conscious design choices: the limits of adjudication. 73 Colum. L. 
Review 1531 (1973).
